Porthole terminates processes, modifies OS firewall rules, and — if you opt in — can kill processes unsupervised via porthole daemon. Please take security reports about it seriously, and we will too.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Instead, use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: go to the Security tab on this repository and open a new draft advisory. If that's not available for you, open a regular issue asking for a private contact channel without describing the vulnerability itself.
Please include:
- Porthole version (
porthole --version) and OS/architecture - Steps to reproduce
- What you expected vs. what happened
- Impact, as you understand it (e.g. "kills a process the user didn't select," "escapes the firewall rule isolation group," "auto-kill daemon acts without the allow-list matching")
We'll acknowledge reports as promptly as we can and keep you updated as a fix is worked on.
In scope:
- The kill ladder incorrectly signaling a process other than the one the user selected (in particular, any PID-reuse bypass)
porthole firewallrules affecting anything outside porthole's own isolated rule group/chain/anchorporthole daemonacting outside its documented safety rails (disabled-by-default, dry-run-by-default without--live, matching outside the exact allow-list, skipping the pre-kill re-verification, ignoring the rate limit)porthole serve's web dashboard: anything reachable from a non-localhost origin, or a cross-origin request able to trigger a kill- Privilege escalation of any kind
- Memory-safety issues from the Windows PEB-reading code (
internal/proc/peb_windows.go,peb_wow64_windows.go) — this code reads undocumented Windows internals and fails closed by design, but a bug there is still worth reporting
Out of scope:
- A killed process the user explicitly targeted behaving as intended
- Denial-of-service via scanning/killing ports you already have local-user permission to see and kill (porthole has no privilege beyond what the invoking user already has)
- Issues requiring physical access or an already-compromised machine
If you're auditing this codebase, the places worth reading most carefully:
internal/kill/kill.go— the ladder'sverifyAndSignal, the single choke point every signal passes throughinternal/daemon/daemon.go— package doc comment lists every safety rail and where it's enforcedinternal/firewall/*.go—RulePrefix-based ownership check, present in everyList/Remove/RemoveAllimplementationinternal/webui/webui.go—sameOrigin, the CSRF mitigation on the kill endpoint
Only the latest released version is supported with security fixes.