fix(deps): update dependency crypto-js to v4 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
crypto-js	^3.1.9-1 → ^4.0.0

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crypto-js: Insufficient Entropy in Cryptographic Secret Generation via Vulnerable CryptoJS Dependency Chain

CVE-2026-71851 / GHSA-rg76-677x-56q9

More information

Details

Summary

CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() in affected versions is not a cryptographically secure random number generator. Nominal requests for 128 or 256 bits of entropy produce effective search spaces of approximately 2^39 and 2^47 possibilities — small enough to enumerate on commodity hardware.

Coinspect's Ill Bloom investigation confirmed that downstream wallet applications used this function as the entropy source for BIP39 recovery phrases.

An application is affected only if it uses the vulnerable function to generate security-sensitive values.

Merely depending on crypto-js < 4.0.0 is not sufficient to be exploitable.

Details

The affected implementation used a custom variation of George Marsaglia's Multiply-With-Carry PRNG, seeded from Math.random(). It was introduced in 3.1.2-4 (June 2014, commit brix/crypto-js@ff1f003) in response to issue #​7, and was present in every 3.x release except 3.2.0 and 3.2.1. That change was reverted in 3.3.0 because it was considered a breaking change, so projects tracking the 3.x line could resolve to newer versions that still contained the weak generator.

4.0.0 replaced the generator with the platform's native cryptographic API.

Applying PBKDF2, another KDF, or a cryptographic hash after the vulnerable generator does not restore missing entropy.

Proof of concept

Coinspect reproduced the attack end to end:

1. Reimplemented the affected WordArray.random() behavior.
2. Enumerated the feasible outputs of the underlying PRNG.
3. Converted candidate entropy values into valid BIP39 recovery phrases.
4. Derived private keys and addresses across the relevant derivation paths and networks.
5. Compared derived addresses against public blockchain data.
6. Recovered the private keys controlling funded addresses.

Impact

An attacker can enumerate the reduced output space and recover security-sensitive values generated through the affected function.

Coinspect documented coordinated drain waves affecting addresses derived from vulnerable recovery phrases. As of July 13, 2026, the measured lower bound of stolen assets across the two events was approximately $5M.

The consequences are persistent:

• Updating an affected library or wallet does not strengthen a previously generated secret.
• Importing the same recovery phrase into an updated software or hardware wallet does not remediate the issue.
• Previously generated secrets may remain exploitable indefinitely.
• Future deposits to an affected address may also be stolen.
• Assets may remain exposed across networks or derivation paths that have not yet shown suspicious activity.

Remediation

For projects:

1. Upgrade crypto-js to version 4.0.0 or later. Where possible, replace CryptoJS randomness with the native Web Crypto API or Node.js crypto module.
2. Audit direct, downstream, and transitive dependencies for versions of crypto-js matching < 4.0.0.
3. Determine whether CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() was used to generate any security-sensitive values.
4. Identify the time periods and application versions during which the vulnerable generation path was present.
5. Treat all long-term secrets generated through an affected path as compromised and rotate them.
6. Notify affected users that installing an update is insufficient when a long-term secret was generated by the vulnerable code.

For wallet users: create a new wallet with a newly generated recovery phrase from a trustworthy source and migrate assets to addresses derived from it. Do not import the existing recovery phrase into the new wallet.

Public address checker

Coinspect provides a public checker for addresses identified in the known Ill Bloom exposed-address datasets:

https://illbloom.org/

Only public blockchain addresses should be entered. Users must never enter a recovery phrase, seed phrase, mnemonic, private key, password, or wallet backup file.

A match indicates that funds controlled by the same recovery phrase may be at immediate risk. A negative result only means that the submitted address was not found in the currently published datasets.

References

• Ill Bloom research site and public address checker:
  https://illbloom.org/
• Coinspect investigation overview:
  https://www.coinspect.com/blog/ill-bloom-investigation/
• CryptoJS issue #​7 — randomBytes is not random enough:
  https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/issues/7
• Commit introducing the MWC-based implementation:
  https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/commit/ff1f0032ff58aedfcc44eb6aa7b2c78207a98009
• Changes between CryptoJS 3.3.0 and 4.0.0:
  https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/compare/3.3.0...4.0.0
• Downstream ferrumnet/bip39 fork:
  https://github.com/ferrumnet/bip39

Severity

• CVSS Score: 9.0 / 10 (Critical)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/security/advisories/GHSA-rg76-677x-56q9
• https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/commit/b405ff597fb3ac76a7bdfbc72dca10ba1079b1d5
• https://github.com/brix/crypto-js
• https://www.coinspect.com/blog/ill-bloom-investigation

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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crypto-js PBKDF2 1,000 times weaker than specified in 1993 and 1.3M times weaker than current standard

CVE-2023-46233 / GHSA-xwcq-pm8m-c4vf

More information

Details

Impact

Summary

Crypto-js PBKDF2 is 1,000 times weaker than originally specified in 1993, and at least 1,300,000 times weaker than current industry standard. This is because it both (1) defaults to SHA1, a cryptographic hash algorithm considered insecure since at least 2005 and (2) defaults to one single iteration, a 'strength' or 'difficulty' value specified at 1,000 when specified in 1993. PBKDF2 relies on iteration count as a countermeasure to preimage and collision attacks.

Potential Impact:

1. If used to protect passwords, the impact is high.
2. If used to generate signatures, the impact is high.

Probability / risk analysis / attack enumeration:

1. For at most $45,000, an attacker, given control of only the beginning of a crypto-js PBKDF2 input, can create a value which has identical cryptographic signature to any chosen known value.
2. Due to the length extension attack on SHA1, we can create a value that has identical signature to any unknown value, provided it is prefixed by a known value. It does not matter if PBKDF2 applies 'salt' or 'pepper' or any other secret unknown to the attacker. It will still create an identical signature.

Update: PBKDF2 requires a pseudo-random function that takes two inputs, so HMAC-SHA1 is used rather than plain SHA1. HMAC is not affected by length extension attacks. However, by defaulting to a single PBKDF2 iteration, the hashes do not benefit from the extra computational complexity that PBKDF2 is supposed to provide. The resulting hashes therefore have little protection against an offline brute-force attack.

crypto-js has 10,642 public users as displayed on NPM, today October 11th 2023. The number of transient dependents is likely several orders of magnitude higher.

A very rough GitHub search shows 432 files cross GitHub using PBKDF2 in crypto-js in Typescript or JavaScript, but not specifying any number of iterations.

Affected versions

All versions are impacted. This code has been the same since crypto-js was first created.

Further Cryptanalysis

The issue here is especially egregious because the length extension attack makes useless any secret that might be appended to the plaintext before calculating its signature.

Consider a scheme in which a secret is created for a user's username, and that secret is used to protect e.g. their passwords. Let's say that password is 'fake-password', and their username is 'example-username'.

To encrypt the user password via symmetric encryption we might do encrypt(plaintext: 'fake-password', encryption_key: cryptojs.pbkdf2(value: 'example username' + salt_or_pepper)). By this means, we would, in theory, create an encryption_key that can be determined from the public username, but which requires the secret salt_or_pepper to generate. This is a common scheme for protecting passwords, as exemplified in bcrypt & scrypt. Because the encryption key is symmetric, we can use this derived key to also decrypt the ciphertext.

Because of the length extension issue, if the attacker obtains (via attack 1), a collision with 'example username', the attacker does not need to know salt_or_pepper to decrypt their account data, only their public username.

Description

PBKDF2 is a key-derivation is a key-derivation function that is used for two main purposes: (1) to stretch or squash a variable length password's entropy into a fixed size for consumption by another cryptographic operation and (2) to reduce the chance of downstream operations recovering the password input (for example, for password storage).

Unlike the modern webcrypto standard, crypto-js does not throw an error when a number of iterations is not specified, and defaults to one single iteration. In the year 2000, when PBKDF2 was originally specified, the minimum number of iterations suggested was set at 1,000. Today, OWASP recommends 1,300,000:

https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/blob/4dcaa7afd08f48cd285463b8f9499cdb242605fa/src/pbkdf2.js#L22-L26

Patches

No available patch. The package is not maintained.

Workarounds

Consult the OWASP PBKDF2 Cheatsheet. Configure to use SHA256 with at least 250,000 iterations.

Coordinated disclosure

This issue was simultaneously submitted to crypto-js and crypto-es on the 23rd of October 2023.

Caveats

This issue was found in a security review that was not scoped to crypto-js. This report is not an indication that crypto-js has undergone a formal security assessment by the author.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/security/advisories/GHSA-xwcq-pm8m-c4vf
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46233
• https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/commit/421dd538b2d34e7c24a5b72cc64dc2b9167db40a
• https://github.com/brix/crypto-js
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/11/msg00025.html

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

brix/crypto-js (crypto-js)

v4.2.0

Compare Source

v4.1.1

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v4.1.0

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v4.0.0

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v3.3.0

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v3.2.1

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v3.2.0

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