Skip to content

Security: machine-made/vscode-pdf-next

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please report security issues privately to the repository owner via GitHub Security Advisories on https://github.com/machine-made/vscode-pdf-next/security/advisories/new, or by opening a minimal public issue asking for a private contact channel.

Do not include exploit details in public issues.

Audit History

Date Auditor Scope Result
2026-04-30 Claude Opus 4.7 src/, lib/*.mjs, tools/, workflows 0 actionable, 2 hardening
2026-04-29 Pi security pass release workflows, packaging, risky API pattern scan 0 actionable findings
2026-04-27 Claude Opus 4.7 src/, CSP, vendored PDF.js, npm advisories 1 critical, 1 high, 2 medium

The 2026-04-27 findings are remediated across 1.3.0 and 1.4.0. The 2026-04-30 hardening items landed in the same pass.

2026-04-30 — Claude Opus 4.7

Scope. Repository-authored TypeScript and webview JavaScript (src/, lib/main.mjs, lib/polyfills.mjs, lib/pdf.worker-wrapper.mjs), tools/scan_vsix.mjs, and .github/workflows/. Vendored PDF.js excluded.

Method. Pattern scan for GitHub Actions injection, shell execution APIs, dynamic code evaluation, browser XSS sinks, plus a manual review of the webview message contract, CSP construction, and PDF link path-traversal handling.

Findings. No actionable findings. Two low-severity hardening items addressed in the same pass:

  • release.yml accepted any release_tag string from workflow_dispatch. Added a ^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?$ regex check at the top of validate_release so malformed tags fail before bun install and before any shell expansion that depends on the tag value.
  • Documented the trusted-workspace printCommand boundary below.

Verified clean.

  • Webview CSP pins script-src to a per-render crypto.randomBytes(16) nonce plus cspSource; no 'unsafe-inline' or 'unsafe-eval'.
  • Host-side message handler rejects unknown types and unknown keys via the closed allowlist in src/webviewContract.ts.
  • resolvePdfLinkTarget rejects URI schemes, absolute paths, and any resolved target whose path.relative escapes the resource directory.
  • src/print.ts and tools/scan_vsix.mjs use spawn / execFileSync with argument arrays; no shell expansion path.
  • All dynamic DOM writes in lib/main.mjs use textContent. The single first-party innerHTML finding is inside vendored PDF.js and is out of scope per the boundary defined here.

Trusted-workspace printCommand. When the active workspace is trusted, pdf-preview.printCommand is read from workspace settings and the resolved binary is launched via child_process.spawn with an argument array. spawn(command, args) does not invoke a shell, so a hostile workspace cannot inject shell metacharacters, but the command itself is operator-controlled. This is by design: VS Code Workspace Trust is the established boundary. Users who do not trust a workspace fall back to inspect().globalValue / defaultValue, so a malicious .vscode/settings.json in an untrusted workspace cannot override the print command.

2026-04-29 — Pi security pass

Scope. Focused release-readiness review of .github/workflows/, repository-authored source, VSIX packaging/scanner scripts, and production npm advisories for the 2.0.0 public release.

Method. Pattern scan for GitHub Actions injection risks, shell execution APIs (exec, execSync), dynamic code execution (eval, new Function), browser XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, unsafe React HTML), Python risky APIs, plus npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high.

Findings. No actionable findings.

Verified clean.

  • GitHub Actions use github.event only in a top-level concurrency expression, not inside shell run: blocks.
  • Third-party workflow actions are pinned by full commit SHA.
  • Marketplace/Open VSX publish secrets are only exposed in the marketplace-publish environment-gated job.
  • No repository-authored exec, execSync, eval, new Function, innerHTML, or document.write hits outside vendored PDF.js.
  • npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high reports 0 vulnerabilities.
  • tools/scan_vsix.mjs rejects source files, maps, tests, scratch/temp files, and missing PDF.js runtime assets in release packages.

Status. Release automation and packaged-artifact checks are suitable for the 2.0.0 public release, assuming the GitHub marketplace-publish environment is configured with required reviewers before registry tokens are added.

2026-04-27 — Claude Opus 4.7

Scope. Static review of src/extension.ts, src/pdfProvider.ts, src/pdfPreview.ts, the webview Content-Security-Policy, the vendored PDF.js version under lib/, npm audit --omit=dev, and the .github/workflows/ directory.

Method. Pattern scan for shell-execution APIs, dynamic code evaluation, browser XSS sinks (innerHTML assignment, document write, React unsafe HTML props), Python risky APIs (n/a — Node project), GitHub Actions injection (n/a — no workflows), and a manual review of the webview HTML construction and message channel.

Findings.

  • Critical — Vendored PDF.js 3.1.81 was affected by CVE-2024-4367 (arbitrary JavaScript execution via crafted PDF, fixed in 4.2.67). Remediated in 1.4.0 by migrating the vendored runtime to pdfjs-dist@5.6.205; PDF.js eval support remains disabled.
  • High — Webview CSP used script-src 'unsafe-inline', which defeats CSP's protection against script injection in the viewer. Remediated in 1.3.0 with a per-load script nonce.
  • Medium — localResourceRoots needed tighter bounds. Remediated in 1.3.0 by limiting roots to the extension directory and the opened PDF's containing directory, which is the directory-style boundary VS Code webviews support for local resources.
  • Medium — CSP omitted worker-src; PDF.js spawns a Web Worker. Remediated in 1.3.0.

Verified clean.

  • No shell-execution or dynamic code evaluation in repository-authored code.
  • No unsafe HTML sinks in src/.
  • npm audit --omit=dev reports 0 vulnerabilities.
  • npm audit --audit-level=high reports 0 high or critical vulnerabilities; the remaining dev-only advisories are moderate findings in @vscode/vsce's Azure auth dependency chain.
  • No secrets, tokens, or API keys in source.
  • No GitHub Actions workflows present, so no workflow-injection surface.

Status. Webview hardening and the PDF.js 5 runtime migration landed in v1.4; PDF.js ran with JavaScript evaluation and WASM disabled.

Update (2026-08). The vendored runtime is now pdfjs-dist@6.2.108. PDF.js 6 removed its eval-based font/PostScript code paths upstream, and the release compat check (tools/check_pdfjs_runtime_compat.mjs) now asserts that no eval( or new Function( exists anywhere in the vendored core, worker, or viewer bundles — a stronger guarantee than the removed isEvalSupported flag. PDF parsing runs in a real Web Worker (the webview never statically imports the worker bundle onto the main thread), and the integration tests assert the real worker spawns via the viewer-ready event's workerType field. WASM execution remains disabled (useWasm: false with the OpenJPEG JavaScript fallback). Document bytes now travel from the extension host to the viewer over the webview message channel, so localResourceRoots is restricted to the extension directory alone — the webview can no longer load anything from the opened PDF's directory.

Update (2026-10). The vendored runtime is now pdfjs-dist@6.4.299, and WebAssembly is enabled for PDF.js's image decoders only. With useWasm: false, the worker tried to import JavaScript fallback decoders from the extension folder, and a worker in a VS Code webview cannot load them. JBIG2, CCITT fax and JPEG 2000 images, which is how most scanned pages are stored, were left out of the page without an error. The webview CSP now adds 'wasm-unsafe-eval' to script-src. That keyword permits WebAssembly compilation; it does not permit eval() or new Function(), and the CSP still has no 'unsafe-eval'. The package ships exactly two modules, lib/pdfjs/wasm/jbig2.wasm and lib/pdfjs/wasm/openjpeg.wasm, copied from the integrity-checked pdfjs-dist tarball. tools/scan_vsix.mjs rejects any other .wasm file and fails a package that is missing either module. The PDF scripting engine (quickjs-eval.wasm) and the colour-management module (qcms_bg.wasm) are not shipped.

There aren't any published security advisories