Email security@kedgeway.xyz, or use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting as an alternative channel. Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and the version or commit affected. We will acknowledge your report and keep you updated while we work on a fix.
In scope:
- Auth token storage: how credentials and client registration are written to
auth.jsonin the config directory ($KEDGEWAY_CONFIG_DIR, else$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/kedgeway, else~/.config/kedgeway) (permissions, leakage into logs or output), and howKEDGEWAY_AUTH/login --exporthandle them. - OAuth flow: dynamic client registration, authorization code + PKCE, the local callback server on
127.0.0.1, state and redirect handling. - Repo scanning: path traversal, symlink handling, unsafe parsing of
Cargo.toml/package.json, or any way a scanned repository can make kedgeway execute code or read outside the scanned path.
Note on the MCP server (kedgeway mcp): its tools take a path and fixture and read those local paths (and, for migrate with write: true, edit manifests there) by design. Writing is disabled unless the server is started with --allow-write. It is a local stdio tool run by the user's own assistant, not a network service; do not expose it to untrusted callers.
Out of scope: vulnerabilities in Stellar Raven itself or in third-party dependencies (report those upstream), and issues requiring a machine that is already compromised.
kedgeway login --export prints a base64 JSON blob containing the OAuth client registration and the access and refresh tokens for Stellar Raven. Treat it exactly like a password:
- Scope: the token carries the
mcpscope Raven granted to kedgeway, nothing more. Anyone holding it can call Raven's tools as you until it is revoked or expires; it does not grant access to your repository or machine. - Handling: store it only as a CI secret (for example the repository secret
KEDGEWAY_AUTH). Never commit, print or log it. kedgeway reads it from the environment, keeps it in memory, never writes it to disk and refreshes it in memory only. - Rotation: rotate it periodically and whenever it may have leaked. Run
kedgeway logout(deletes the local credentials), thenkedgeway login --exportand replace the secret. Remove the old secret value from CI. - Rotating refresh tokens: Raven rotates the refresh token on every refresh. kedgeway refreshes the token in memory only and cannot write the new refresh token back to the secret, so the stored secret can go stale or be invalidated after use; re-export and replace the secret when runs start failing, and treat any failure as a reason to rotate. Right after
login --exportthe secret and the localauth.jsonshare one refresh token, and a refresh by either copy can invalidate the other: runkedgeway logoutandkedgeway loginlocally after exporting so your machine gets its own session. - Local session (
auth.json): refreshed tokens are written back atomically (also bykedgeway doctor), under theauth.json.lockfile lock and only if the file still holds the same session and client (a refresh never recreates a logged-outauth.json). A rejected refresh never deletes the stored credentials; kedgeway only deletes the rejected tokens when an interactive login replaces them, and only if they are still the ones on disk. - Fork pull requests do not receive repository secrets; the action will fail there with its "set
fixtureorauth" message unless you usefixture.
The snapshot cache ($XDG_CACHE_HOME/kedgeway/snapshot.json, mode 0600) holds only public ecosystem data, no credentials.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.x (latest minor only) | Yes |
| Older 0.x minors | No |
We follow a 90-day coordinated disclosure window: please give us up to 90 days from your report to ship a fix before publishing details. We will credit reporters who want credit.